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Abstract 
Multicast in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) is an attractive mechanism for delivering data to multiple receivers as it 
saves bandwidth. To guarantee the security of multicast, the group key is used to encrypt and decrypt the packages. However, 
providing key management services in WSNs is complicated because sensor nodes possess limited resources of computing, 
storage and communication. To address the balance between security and limited resources, a multicast group key 
management protocol based on the weight-balanced 2-3 tree is proposed to generate, distribute, and update the group key 
securely and efficiently. The decentralized group key management method is employed. A weight-balanced 2-3 key tree is 
formed in every subgroup. Instead of using the conventional symmetric and non-symmetric encryption algorithms, the 
Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) code technique is used to distribute the multicast key dynamically. During the key 
updating, a series of adjustment rules are summarized to keep the tree weight-balanced, where pseudo-nodes as leaves are 
added to reduce the computation and communication complexity. Compared with some other group key management 
protocols, our scheme shows higher superiority on security and performance. 
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1. Introduction 
  In a WSN, multicast is a more efficient method of supporting group communication than unicast, which can 
save bandwidth and energy largely. Because sensor nodes suffer from limited resources such as low computation 
capability, small memory, limited energy resources and low bandwidth, multicast is widely used in sensor-based 
applications such as environment monitoring, health-care monitoring, etc [1]. In general, multicast is far more 
vulnerable than unicast because the transmission takes place over multiple network channels [6]. It is an important 
issue to assure the security for the multicast communication in WSNs. Due to the resource constraints of sensor 
nodes, security in WSNs imposes several challenges which are more complex than those in the other traditional 
networks [2]. At the same time, the large number of sensor nodes employed to monitor critical parameters, the lack 
of a specific network architecture or infrastructure, and the frequent topology changes due to the nodes mobility 
also bring the challenges when we design the group key management protocol [3].  
  To overcome these issues, the first security challenge is to provide an effective method to protect information 
through encryption, i.e., every message must be encrypted with the Group Key (GK). GK is known only by legal 
group members. The second security challenge is that GK should be changed when the nodes join or leave the 
group. Changing GK can not only prevent a new member from deciphering previous messages encrypted with the 
old GK, but also prevent a leaving or expelled member from accessing the subsequent messages. The third security 
challenge is to consider the balance between the security and the limited resources of sensors. 
   
  To sum up the above arguments, the multicast key agreement protocol in WSNs should meet the following 
requirements:  
  (1) Backward secrecy [4, 5]: It is used to prevent a new member from decoding messages exchanged before it 
joins the group.  
  (2) Forward secrecy [5]: It is used to prevent a leaving or expelled group member from continuously accessing 
the group’s communication.  
  (3) Key Independence: GK should be random enough and there is no any correlation between each other. 
  (4) Low computation, storage and communication cost: As sensors possess limited resources, the resources 
should be used as few as possible when a GK is computed. 
  In this paper, we propose a tree-based hierarchical group key management scheme for WSNs to meet the above 
requirements. The decentralized group key management method is employed and the main contributions are as 
follows. 
  (1) The key tree is used to efficiently compute and update GK. In our paper, the network model is shown in Fig. 
1. The Base Station (BS) acts as the whole tree root in the layer one and is responsible for managing the whole tree. 
In the layer two, subgroups are divided according to the domain in which every Sink Node (SN) locates. SN stands 
for the sub-tree root and is responsible for managing its sub-tree. The sensor nodes except SNs act as the leaves in 
layer two. The other nodes except BS, SNs and leaves are logic nodes in order to form a weight-balanced 2-3 tree, 
where each internal node has degree 2 or 3. A weight-balanced 2-3 tree can achieve the lowest worst-case cost 
when membership changes [28]. According to the network model, the decentralized group key management 
method is employed in our paper. The keys of all nodes form a key tree. GK serves as the root and the subgroup 
keys correspond to the SN nodes. Each member stores all the keys along the path from itself to the tree root. 
  (2) The Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) code technique is used to distribute GK dynamically. Compared 
with the symmetric or asymmetric cryptography mechanisms, MDS codes [24] can reduce the computation load 
and the energy consumption of each group member, which also maintains low and balanced communication 
complexity and storage complexity for secure multicast key distribution.  
  (3) A series of adjustment rules for the 2-3 trees are set to keep the tree balanced when the membership changes. 
In order to reduce the computation and communication complexity, pseudo-nodes as leaves are added to keep the 
tree balanced if necessary. 
 
Fig. 1. The network model 
   The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss related work. Section 3 describes 
the proposed group key management protocol based on the weight-balanced 2-3 tree in detail. The security and 
performance analysis are given in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Related Work 
  Group key management creates, distributes and updates GK for the group members. The group key 
management protocols can be divided into three main categories [8]: the centralized group key management 
protocol, the distributed group key management protocol and the decentralized group key management protocol.  
  In the centralized group key management protocols [8, 9, 17, 18, 19], a BS is employed to control the whole 
group as a group controller (GC). BS assigns a secret key to each group member and encrypts GK separately by 
each member’s secret key when a new GK needs regenerating and distributing. Unfortunately, the centralized 
group key management protocol does not suit the highly dynamic WSNs because frequent joining or leaving of 
members brings great computation burden on GC and causes the single point of failure easily.  
  In order to overcome the shortcomings of the centralized group key management protocol, the distributed key 
management protocol is proposed [10,11,12]. GC does not exist and group members are peer to peer, therefore GK 
is generated by all the members. A group rekeying scheme (PCGR) for filtering false data was proposed [12], 
whose basic idea is that the GK can be preloaded to the sensor nodes before deployment and neighbors can 
collaborate to protect and appropriately use the preloaded keys. However, the authors do not address the group 
rekeying problem when the group includes sensor nodes separated by multiple hops. A group key distribution via 
local collaboration protocol (GKD) was proposed [10]. GKD is not only based on pre-distributed personal secrets 
and broadcast information, but also requires local collaboration among sensor nodes. The network lifetime is 
divided into time intervals known as sessions. At each session, BS broadcasts to the whole group in order to 
initiate the group key updating. To derive the GK actually hidden in the broadcast message, a node has to seek 
trust and exchange secrets with others. Such distributed group key management protocol can avoid the single point 
of failure, but brings more difficulty on group management owning to lack of the centralized control. As the size 
of the network increases, the communication and computation costs on each sensor node will also increase [19].  
  The decentralized group key management protocol as the third approach is proposed [7, 13, 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, 
22, 23]. The large group is divided into small subgroups. Each subgroup is independent of each other, and the 
membership change in a subgroup can be confined locally. Because a WSN usually is divided into several clusters, 
the protocols for a WSN can be categorized into this approach [7]. The centralized group key management or the 
distributed group key management protocol can be used in every subgroup.  A scalable and efficient master key 
management protocol was proposed [7]. Two types of keys, the cluster key and the master key, are generated in 
this protocol. Sensor nodes in the same cluster shares a cluster key with their gateway node and utilize this cluster 
key to encrypt cluster traffic. Besides, all sensor nodes share a master key with the base station. When group 
member’s move, the communication and computation cost of each component for master key renewing can be 
confined to the affected cluster. The base station can utilize this master key to securely broadcast the information 
   
to all sensor nodes. A novel key agreement protocol based on layer-cluster group model was proposed [20]. In this 
protocol, the cluster keys are generated based on security elliptic curves, which can offer smaller system 
parameters, lower power consumptions and faster implementations. A Refined Key Link Tree (RKLT) scheme 
was proposed [21]. The main contribution of this paper is the introduction of a dirty key path into the key link tree, 
which starts with a leaf node and ends with the root node if the keys of the auxiliary nodes in this path don’t get 
updated after the leaf node leaves. During the key update, RKLT scheme delays the modification of auxiliary 
nodes in order to reduce the number of reduplicate key update messages for the same auxiliary nodes, which also 
brings down the energy cost. A new energy-efficient key management scheme for networks based on secret 
sharing (GKSS) was proposed [22]. The cluster heads choose the one-order polynomial to calculate the secret 
shares which are encrypted by the symmetric keys preloaded into the nodes. 
  The decentralized group key management protocol is a hybrid group key management scheme involving both 
centralized and distributed key management schemes, which is a kind of more practical key management scheme. 
But all the protocols mentioned above show defects in computation and storage cost. During the group key 
distribution scheme, a basic operation is to distribute a piece of secret data to a small group of members, where 
each shares a key with the subgroup controller. In the existing schemes, this is done by symmetric encryption 
algorithms. Frequent key update caused by the frequent membership change may bring expensive computation and 
high storage requirements, which cannot be afforded by sensor nodes with limited resources. It is a critical issue to 
design a provably secure group key management protocol with practicability, simplicity, and strong security in 
WSNs. 
 
3. Our Group Key Management Protocol  
  As noted in section 1, our group key management protocol for WSNs is based on weight-balanced 2-3 trees, 
where the distributed group key management method is employed. BS is responsible for the whole tree. Instead of 
using the conventional symmetric and non-symmetric encryption algorithms, MDS is employed to distribute the 
multicast key dynamically. In this section we begin with a brief discussion of the group initialization. Next, we 
introduce our protocol when membership changes such as join, leave, mergence, and partitions. The authentication 
between nodes is beyond the scope of this paper. Our main aim is focus on how to manage the GK. For ease of 
reference, the notations used in the protocol description are listed in Table 1. 
3.1 Group Initialization  
  In our protocol, keys are arranged in a logic tree hierarchy. One-way functions are used to compute a tree of 
keys [21]. Fig. 1 shows a key tree including sixteen members. BSK  as GK is shared by all group members. The 
keys in this tree are computed from the leaves to the root. Each internal node key can be used as a subgroup key 
for all descendent members of the internal node. 
1SN
K ,
2SN
K and 
3SN
K  are three subgroup keys. For example, 
1SN
K is 
shared by members 1u  to 8u . 
 Table 1. Notations of protocol description  
Symbol Description 
( )kE m  Encrypt message m using key k 
GK Group key 
T  Internal node in the tree 
xK  A key of the node x 
H A cryptographically strong hash function 
 
  In all current existing schemes for WSNs, the update of GK is fulfilled by multiple encryption and decryption 
operations. In order to reduce these operations, MDS codes are used to achieve the dynamic key distribution. MDS 
codes are a class of error control codes that meet the Singleton bound [24, 25]. The well known Reed-Solomon 
codes are widely used as a class of MDS codes. Let GF(q) be a finite filed with q elements, an (n, k) linear block 
code is an error control code which maps from ( )kGF q  to ( )nGF q . Let E( ) be an encoding function, E(m)=c is set 
where 1 2 3... km m m m m= is  the original message code and 1 2 3... nc c c c c=  is its code word block with k n≤ . Let D( ) be 
a decoding function, 
1 2 1 2
( ... , , ,... )
ki i i k
D c c c i i i m=  is set with 1 ji n≤ ≤ and 1 j k≤ ≤  where 1 2 3... km m m m m= is  the 
original message code. For an (n, k) MDS code, the k original message symbols can be recovered from any k of its 
code word block.  
  During the group initialization, every SN assigns its member a different random number ij  and a random hash 
value is  such as the hash value of MD5 algorithm securely. The pair ( , )i ij s  is used as iu ’s seed key and kept in 
the local database of SN. BS also assigns a seed key for every SN securely. As shown in Fig. 1, 1SN  assigns seed 
keys for 1u to 8u . 1SN  maintains a tree whose depth is three. Group members from 1u  to 8u  are leaf nodes and 1T , 
2T and 3T are logic nodes. 1SN  needs to assign a different position number to every node which can be seen as ij . 
The root of 1u  and 2u is the logic node 11T . 1SN  executes the following steps[25] to compute 11TK  in Fig. 2(a): 
  (1) 1SN  randomly chooses a fresh element r in F, which has not been used to generate previous keys.  
  (2) 1SN computes ( ) : ( || )ij iGF q c H s r=  for every leaf iu  with 1...i n= . 
  (3) Using all the 
ij
c in the step (2), 1SN  constructs a code word c of the ( , )L n MDS code C and the ( ij )th 
symbol of c is 
ij
c . Since c is an ( , )L n MDS code, the code word c is uniquely determined by its n symbols. Using 
an efficient erasure decoding algorithm for c, 1SN  can easily calculate the n corresponding message symbols 
1 2 3... nm m m m . 
  (4) 1SN  sets the new session key 11TK  to be the first message symbol 1m . 
  (5) 1SN  multicasts r and 2 3... nm m m  to 1u , 2u and 3u . 
   
 
(a) The process of generating the key   (b) The process of releasing the key 
Fig. 2. The process of generating and releasing the key 
 
  Upon receiving r and 2 3... nm m m  from 1SN , an authorized group member[30] executes the following steps to 
obtain the new session key in Fig. 3(b): 
  (1) Calculate ( || )
ij i
c H s r=  with its seed key ( , )i ij s . 
  (2) Calculate 1m  with ijc  and 2 3... nm m m  by the following equation [26]. 
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  (3) Recover 
1T
K ,i.e., 
11T
K = 1m . 
  1SN  performs the same process to compute 12TK and 13TK  as shown in Fig. 2(a). In order to save the storage, 
1SN does not assign random hash values 11Ts , 12Ts , and 13Ts to the logic nodes and computes 11 1 2Ts s s= ⊕ , 
12 3 4 5T
s s s s= ⊕ ⊕ , and 
13 6 7 8T
s s s s= ⊕ ⊕ . Next, 1SN  executes the same process to compute 1SNK as the subgroup key. 
Similarly, 2SN and 3SN compute 2SNK  and 3SNK , and BS computes BSK  as GK. Each member stores all the keys 
along the path from the corresponding leaf to the root in the tree. 1SN  multicasts the following messages: 
111
( )
Tk SN
E k , 
112
( )
Tk SN
E k , 
113 SN
( )
Tk
E k  and 
1
( )
SNk BS
E k .  
3.2 Group Membership Events 
  A comprehensive group key management scheme must provide key adjustment protocols stemming from 
membership changes. We distinguish among single and multiple member operations. Our protocol can handle the 
following four operations: 
  (1) Joining: a new member is added to the group. 
  (2) Leaving: a member is removed from the group. 
  (3) Mergence: multiple users are added to the group. 
  (4) Partition: multiple users are removed from the group. 
  To achieve both the backward secrecy and the forward secrecy, a new GK must be regenerated when 
membership changes. MDS code is used to achieve the dynamic key distribution. In order to weigh the 
 communication cost as the number of encrypted messages to update the keys by SN, the following definition is 
borrowed [27]. The weight iw  of a node i is the sum of the degrees of all nodes on the path from node i to the root. 
Supposing that the ancestor weight of the root BS is 0rw = , p is defined to be the parent of i for i r≠ , and deg( )p  
is defined to be the degree for the node p. Then deg( )r pw w p= +  is set. The tree weight ( )W T  is the maximum 
degree in the tree such as 1 2( ) ( ) 0W U W U= = , 11( ) 2W T = , and 12 13( ) ( ) 3W T W T= = . A node is weight-balanced if the 
node weight of its children differs by at most 1. A weight-balanced 2-3 tree is defined, where all nodes are weight-
balanced and all internal nodes have degree 2 or 3. The following sections present the rekeying process and the 
tree adjustment rules when membership changes.  
3.2.1 A Sensor Node’s Joining  
  When a sensor node joins the network, GK is renewed to satisfy the backward secrecy. In order to reduce the 
communication cost and keep the tree balanced, the joing sensor node should be inserted into the node whose 
children are leaves with the minimum ancestor weight ( )W T in the tree. For example, the rekeying process is 
followed when a new user 17u  joins the group in Fig. 3. 
  (1) The minimum weight of the whole tree is 11( ) 2W T = , therefore 17u  will be inserted into the subtree whose 
root is 11T .  
  (2) 1SN  assigns a seed key for 17u . 
  (3) 1SN  regenerates the  new session key 11TK ′ for 1u , 2u and 17u . 
  (4) BS  regenerates the  new GK ′ . 
  (5) The following messages ( )
BSk BS
E k ′  , 
1
11
( )
T
SNk
E k′ ′  and 
11
( )
T
BSk
E k′ ′  are multicasted. 
  Because the joing sensor node should be inserted into the node whose children are leaves with the minimum 
ancestor weight ( )W T in the tree, the node weight of its children differs by at most 1. We show rules for insertion 
in Fig. 4. We borrow the following definitions on the tree properties [27, 29]. For each rule, the left part shows the 
subtree before applying the rule and the right part shows the subtree after applying the rule. The number above the 
arrow shows the change in the node weight of the subtree root and the number below the arrow shows the 
communication cost for applying the rule. The upper right of every node shows the node weight. The symbol “/” 
means “or”, for example 4/5 means the weight may be 4 or 5. Note that some of the nodes do not show the node 
weight, which means that the node weight is not constrained and can be chosen to be any value that maintains 
weight-balanced with its siblings. In Fig. 4(d), the black node represents a pseudo-node used to reduce the 
communication cost and keep the tree weight-balanced when membership changes. In the other rules (a), (b), (c), 
and (e), pseudo-nodes are not necessary because the tree can keep balanced with the existing sensor nodes. 
Because insertions are always done at a point that causes the minimal increase in tree weight, the tree is still 
weight-balanced.  
   
 
Fig. 3. A node’s joining 
 
Fig. 4. The adjustment rules corresponding to a node’s joining 
3.2.2 A Sensor Node’s Leaving 
  GK must be renewed to satisfy the forward secrecy when a sensor node leaves. The position cases where the 
removed node may locate are shown in Fig. 5. The deletion of a single node will cause imbalance in the tree. In 
our protocol, the virtual nodes, i.e. pseudo-nodes will be filled into the positions of the tree leaves to keep the tree 
weight-balanced and minimize the key update operations.  The adjustment rules are summarized in Fig. 6 and Fig. 
7. The adjustment rules for the bottom layer led by the imbalance are shown in Fig. 6, and the rules for the middle 
layer are shown in Fig. 7. These rules can be applied recursively. 
  For example 18u  will be removed in Fig. 8, the following steps illustrate how to apply the above rules and how 
to update GK. 18u ’s position corresponds to the Fig. 5 (a) and a pseudo-node is added to the tree by the rule of Fig. 
6 (a). 11( )W T  is the same as before, so the adjustment for the middle layer is not necessary.  
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Fig. 5. The positions of a single node’s leaving  
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Fig. 6. The adjustment rules corresponding to a node’s leaving in the bottom layer  
  
Fig. 7. The adjustment rules corresponding to a node’s leaving in the middle layer  
 
Fig. 8. An example of deleting 18u  
 
Fig. 9. The adjustment rules corresponding to mergence 
3.2.3 Mergence 
  When multiple sensor nodes join the tree controlled by iSN , iSN  will construct these nodes into a weight-
balanced 2-3 tree with the lowest tree weight. If the new tree weight is less than the old tree weight, the new tree 
will be merged into the old tree. On the contrary, the old tree will be merged into the new tree. By experiments, we 
can always find a node in the higher weight tree whose tree weight difference does not exceed three compared with 
   
the smaller weight tree. The adjustment rules are listed in Fig. 9. If the tree weight in the upper layers becomes 
imbalanced, the set of rules can be used in Fig. 7. The key update process has been mentioned in Section 3.2. 
3.2.4 Partition  
  When multiple sensor nodes wants to leave the tree controlled by iSN , iSN  will delete these nodes one by one. 
The tree structure will be reconstructed after all nodes have left the group. The tree balance adjustments will be 
from bottom to top until all the subtrees are balanced. On the one hand, if the node tree weight of its children 
differs by less than 3, the adjustment rules will be classified into the bottom layer rules and the upper layer rules. 
In the bottom layer, some rules are shown in Fig. 6 and the other rules are shown in Fig. 10. In the upper layer, 
some rules are shown in Fig. 7 and the other rules are set in Fig. 11. On the other hand, if the node tree weight of 
its children differs by more than 3, the rules are the same as those in Fig. 9.  
 
Fig. 10. The adjustment rules corresponding to partition in the upper layer 
 
Fig. 11. The adjustment rules corresponding to partition in the lowest layer  
 
4. Security and Performance Analysis 
  In this section, we give the security analysis in terms of guessing attack, key independence, forward secrecy, 
backward secrecy and conspiracy attack. Performance analysis are also given in terms of computation, storage and 
communication overhead. We compare our protocol with PCGR [12], GKD [10], and GKSS [22]. Symbols are 
used in Table 2. 
4.1 Security Analysis  
  (1) Guessing attack: As mentioned above, GK is computed based on the random r  and seed keys of all 
members. Since r and 2 3... nm m m from iSN  are multicasted in plaintext and thus known to all parties including 
unauthorized receivers who attempt to access the current session, the security of the new session key relies on the 
 secrecy of a code word symbol 
ij
c  that only authorized member iu  can compute. Because the equation 
( ) : ( || )
ij i
GF q c H s r=   is set, attackers can get GK only by the following three ways [25]: Brute-force attack, 
guessing a symbol 
ij
c , and guessing iu ’s seed key. 
Table 2. Notations of analysis  
Symbol Meaning 
t  The order of polynomial 
L  the length of GK 
rl  the length of a random number r  
jl  the length of ij , the maximum length is m 
h  Tree’s height 
E/D Encryption/ Decryption operation 
n  Number of leaves 
1n  The number of other nodes except the leaves, its value is within 1 1[2 1, (3 1) / 2]h h− −− −  
deg( )x  The degree of the node x 
M/U Multicast/ Unicast 
EC , DC , HC , EPC  The computation cost of one evaluation of encryption, decryption, hash function and, the module exponentiation. 
MC  The computation cost of the matrix multiplication 
 
  The effort that an attacker makes to deduce GK depends on the following parameters, namely, the size of finite 
field (2 )mGF , t , rl  and l . The longer the size of these parameters is l , the more difficultly GK can be guessed. 
The exact sizes of these parameters can ensure the security of GK. If rm t l l= = =  is satisfied, the effort that an 
attacker needs to deduce a GK is no less than that of a brute-force attack, which can be proved by the following 
three proofs.  
  ① The entropy of GK is 2( ) logH GK GK l= = . 
  ② The entropy of  
ij
c  is 2( ) log 2i
m
jH c m l= = = . If an attacker wants to infer GK by guessing ijc , he must first 
pick up an arbitrary location ij  where 1in j n n≤ ≤ + . 
  ③ The entropy of is is 2( ) log 2tjH s t m l= = = = , while the entropy of iS including is  and ij  is 
2( ) ( ) ( ) logi i iH S H s H j l L= + = +  . Considering the fact that r  is also known to the attacker, the effort that an 
attacker needs to deduce is  from r  and ijc   is the conditional entropy ( | , ) ( )ii j iH s r c H s l= = . 
  Combining all the above possible attacks, the amount of information to guess a true l -bit GK is at least l  bits, 
i.e., the attacker needs to make as much effort as a brute-force attack to deduce the right GK.  
   (2) Confidentiality of communication: Multicast messages are encrypted by GK known by legal sensor nodes. 
   (3) Forward security: A leaving member can not access the subquent messages after before it leaves the group.   
   
.  (4) Backward security: A new member can not decode messages exchanged before it joins the group.  
. (5) Group Key Secrecy: In Section 3, it has expounded that only legal members can gain GK, therefore it is 
computationally infeasible for a passive adversary to discover GK. 
  (6) Key Independence: The freshness of GK is decided by the random number r , thus GK is independent 
because of the independent r . The number of GK is decided by rl , i.e. 2 rl .  
  (7) Conspiracy attack: A conspiracy attack means that some old members cooperate to deduce the current GK. 
Since the independence, the forward secrecy and the backward secrecy of GK can be guaranteed, one possible way 
for an old member to get a new GK is to calculate the seed key of a current member from old keys. It is easy to 
compute a symbol 
ij
c  based on the equation (1). ( || )ij ic H s r=  is set, therefore it is impossible or at least 
computationally hard  to compute a seed key is even if ijc  is known.  
4.2 Performance Analysis  
  In this section, performance analysis are focus on the computation, communication and storage overhead of 
every sink node and every sensor node. We analyze from the group initialization and the four operations of joing, 
leaving, mergence and partition.  
4.2.1 Performance Analysis on Group Initialization 
  (1) Communication complexity 
When a new member iu  is authorized to join a multicast group, its SN  will assign a seed key pair ( , )i ij s  to it 
securely. The number of unicast messages comes to nU . 
  SN  multicasts r and 2 3... nm m m  to every member in plaintext whose length is  ( 1)rl n m+ −  . As already discussed, 
it is secure enough to set rm t l l= = = . Thus, the length of multicast message is ( 1)rl n m nl+ − =  if the length of im  
is m  bit. 
  SN multicasts the keys in the key path encrypted by the node keys in the penultimate layer. The total number in 
the penultimate layer is 2 2[2 ,3 ]h h− − , therefore the total number of multicast messages is 2 2[2 ,3 ] 2h h M− − × . 
 (2) Computation complexity 
  SN  unicasts a seed key pair ( , )i ij s  to every member securely, hence the encryption operations of SN  are nCE. 
SN  computes ( ) : ( || )
ij i
GF q c H s r=  for every node, hence the hash operations are [2 1, (3 1) / 2]h h HC− − , i.e., 
1( ) Hn n C+ .  
  Every node performs matrix operations to recover GK or the subgroup key, hence the computation cost is 1 Mn C . 
Every sensor node decrypts to get its seed key and its keys in the key path, i.e., 2H DC C+ . 
  (3) Storage complexity 
  SN  needs to store the seed keys of all members, i.e., 2( log )n L t+⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ . Since it is secure to set rm t l l= = = , and 
the maximum of L is 2 1m + [28], 2( log ) (2 1)n L t n l+ = +⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥  can be inferred. Moreover, SN needs 1 rn l  bits to store the 
 keys. 
  A current member iu only needs (2 1)l +  bits to store its seed key and ( 1) rh l−  bits to store keys in its key path. 
4.2.2 Performance Analysis on A Node’s Joining 
  (1) Communication complexity 
  SN  unicasts a seed key pair to the new member securely. SN multicasts once in order to let the new member 
compute the new sub-group key. The keys from the insertion node to the root should be updated, therefore SN  
needs ( 2)h M− . SN  multicast the new GK to all the old members. In short, the total communication cost is 
hM U+ . 
  (2) Computation complexity 
  SN  unicasts a seed key pair ( , )i ij s  to every new member securely, therefore the computation cost is EC . The 
keys from the insertion node to the root should be updated, hence SN  needs ( 1) Mh C− and [2( 1),3( 1)] Hh h C− − . 
  Every new member needs one HC to get ijc , one DC to get its seed key and one DC to get its keys in the key path, 
i.e, 2H DC C+ . Every old member needs one DC to get the new GK. 
  (3) Storage complexity 
  SN  needs 2( log ) (2 1)n L t n l+ = +⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥  bits to store seed keys for members and 1 rn l  bits to store the keys of the 
nodes . 
  A current member iu only needs (2 1)l +  bits to store its seed key and ( 1) rh l−  bits to store keys in its key path. 
4.2.3 Performance Analysis on A Node’s Leaving 
  (1) Communication complexity 
The tree should be reconstructed. SN  needs to 2 2[2 ,3 ] [deg( ) 1]h h iM S M− − + −  to send the new GK with 3h ≥ . 
  (2) Computation complexity 
The keys from the deletion node to the root should be updated, hence SN  needs ( 1) Mh C−  and [2( 1),3( 1)] Hh h C− − . 
Some nodes whose positions change need H DC C+ , while other members need one DC to get the new GK. 
  (3) Storage complexity 
  SN  needs (2 1)n l +  bits to store seed keys for members and 1 rn l  bits to store the keys of the nodes . 
  A current member iu only needs (2 1)l +  bits to store its seed key and ( 1) rh l−  bits to store keys in its key path. 
4.2.4 Performance Analysis on Mergence 
  When multiple sensor nodes join a tree, these multiple sensor nodes will be reconstructed a weight-balanced 
tree. In order to facilitate discussion, supposing the height of the new tree is 1h , the height of the old tree is 2h  and 
1 2h h≤  is set, the new tree will be merged into the old tree. After mergence, the tree height is 2 1h +  with n  nodes. 
If the tree with the height 1h  is seen as a logic node, the most complex case is that the positions of all the nodes in 
the tree branches of the logic node’s grandfather p  will change.  
   
  (1) Communication complexity 
The communication complexity of the tree initialization with the height 1h  is xU + M + 1 12 2[2 ,3 ]h h M− − . 
  For the tree with height 2h , the new GK encrypted by the old GK is multicasted. The tree with height 1h  is seen 
as a logic node, and   the new GK of its sibling brothers (2/3) encrypted by the old GK is multicasted. At the same 
time, the keys from its p to the root need update. The total communication complexity is 1( ) (1 2 / 3)h h M M− + + , 
i.e., 1( 3 / 4)h h M− + . 
  (2) Computation complexity 
  Supposing that there are x  members in the tree of 1h , SN  needs 1 12 2[2 ,3 ]h h HC+ +  to merge these two trees into one. 
SN needs ExC  to send the seed key pairs securely. SN  needs 1 12 2 1[2 ,3 ] ( )h h M h h M− − + −  to multicast the keys of the 
logic nodes. 
  Every new member needs one HC to get ijc , one DC  to get its seed key and one DC  to get its keys in the key 
path, i.e, 2H DC C+ . Every old needs one DC  to get the new GK. 
  (3) Storage complexity 
  SN  needs (2 1)n l +  bits to store seed keys for members and 1 rn l  bits to store the keys of the nodes . 
  A current member iu only needs (2 1)l +  bits to store its seed key and ( 1) rh l−  bits to store keys in its key path. 
4.2.5 Performance Analysis on Partition 
  The most complicated case is the same as the group re-initialization due to the irregularities of partition. In this 
case, the performance anylysis are the same as those of the initialization. 
4.2.6 Performance Comparison 
  In this section, our protocol is compared with PCGR [12] and GKD [10] in terms of storage, computation and 
communication overhead. Our protocol belongs to the decentralized management protocol, while PCGR and GKD 
belong to the distributed key management protocol. The comparison results are shown from Table 3 to Table 5. 
From these tables, we can see that the performance of our protocol is superior to PCGR and GKD. With the 
increasement of leaf nodes, the storage overhead in our protocol is proportional to the tree height, while 
computation and communication cost is constant as shown in Fig. 12. The storage, computation and 
communication of PCGR and GKD are proportional to the number of tree leaves as shown in Fig. 12.  
 
Table 3. The comparison on the group initialization among our protocol, PCGR and GKD 
 Our protocol PCGR GKD 
Storage overhead (2 1) ( 1)L h L+ + −  ( 1)( 1)n t L+ +  (2 3 )t w L+ +  
Computation overhead 2H DC C+  2(( 1) ) En t nCΟ + +  2(2 )tΟ  
Communication overhead 0 ( 1)n t L+  5( 1)
2 B
t n L+  
 
 Table 4. The comparison on a node’s joining among our protocol, PCGR and GKD 
 Our protocol PCGR GKD 
Storage overhead (2 1) ( 1)L h L+ + −  ( 1)( 1)n t L+ +  ( 1)m L+  
Computation overhead 2H DC C+  3( ) EnCμΟ +  3( ) Et nCΟ +  
Communication overhead 0 nL  ( 1)t L+  
 
Table 5. The comparison on a node’s leaving among our protocol, PCGR and GKD 
 Our protocol B-PCGR GKD 
Storage overhead (2 1) ( 1)L h L+ + −  ( 1)( 1)n t L+ +  ( 1)m L+  
Computation overhead H DC C+  3( ) EnCμΟ +  3( ) Et nCΟ +  
Communication overhead 0 nL  ( 1)t L+  
 
   
(a) The comparison on the group initialization      (b) The comparison on group rekeying 
Fig. 12. The comparison on the group initialization 
 
(a) The comparison of adding a member        (b) The comparison of deleting a member 
Fig. 13. The comparison of adding a member 
  GKSS [22] belongs to the distributed key management protocol as our protocol. The secret shares are calculated 
by the cluster heads which choose the one-order polynomial to improve efficiency. Our scheme is compared with 
GKSS Table 6 to Table 8. From these tables, we can see that the storage of the sink node and the ordinary node in 
our protocol and GKSS is almost identical, which varies directly with the number of tree leaves as shown in Fig. 
   
13. When GK is updated, the computation and communication of our protocol is proportional to the tree height and 
the computation and communication of GKSS is proportional to the number of leaves, which shows that our 
protocol is superior to GKSS as shown in Fig. 13. 
Table 6. The comparison on initializing the group between our protocol and GKSS 
 Our protocol GKSS 
 SN The ordinary node SN The ordinary node 
Storage overhead 1(2 1)n L n L+ +  (2 1) ( 1)L h L+ + −  (2 3)n L+  4L  
Computation overhead 1 1( )E H MnC n n C n C+ + + 2H DC C+  EnC  DC  
Communication overhead 2nL  0 ( )n m L+  0 
 
Table 7. The comparison on a node’s joining between our protocol and GKSS 
 Our protocol GKSS 
 SN The ordinary node SN The ordinary node 
Storage overhead 1(2 1)n L n L+ +  (2 1) ( 1)L h L+ + − (2 3)n L+  4L  
Computation overhead [2( 1),3( 1)] ( 1)E H MC h h C h C+ − − + − 2H DC C+  2(2 ) EnCΟ +  (1) DCΟ +  
Communication overhead [ 3, 4]h h L+ +  0 4( )n h n+  0 
 
Table 8. The comparison on a node’s leaving between our protocol and GKSS  
 Our protocol GKSS 
 SN The ordinary node SN The ordinary node 
Storage overhead 1(2 1)n L n L+ +  (2 1) ( 1)L h L+ + −  (2 3)n L+  4L  
Computation overhead [2( 1),3( 1)] ( 1)H Mh h C h C− − + − H DC C+  2(2 ) EnCΟ +  (1) DCΟ +  
Communication overhead 2 2[2 ,3 ] [deg( ) 1]h h iL S L L
− − + − + 0 2 4( )L n h n+ +  0 
5. Conclusion 
  In this paper, we present a group multicast key management protocol based on the weight-balanced 2-3 tree. In 
our protocol, the whole group is divided into two layers. The decentralized group key management is adopted, 
while the whole group is organized as an irregular tree and every subgroup is organized as a weight-balanced 2-3 
tree.  Hence, our scheme takes advantages of both centralized group key management method and distributed key 
group management method. Compared with some other protocols, our protocol shows higher superiority on 
security, scalability and performance, which is more suitable for WSNs.  
  As part of our future work, we intend to do more research on fault-tolerant features for scheme in order to 
prevent some of communication messages from being lost during the key distribution and updating. We will also 
evaluate our scheme by simulations and test-bed experiments. 
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